

The Future of Liberal Democracies In Conversation with Henry Kissinger

[00:00:00 – 03:03] Silence, introductory image

[00:03:03 – 03:10] Music and Chatham House logo

[00:03:10 – 07:07] Introductory speeches

Dr Robin Niblett CMG¹: [00:03:19] Second, sorry, I pressed my little button too quickly. I was about to say welcome to Chatham House, welcome to this second in our series on the future of liberal democracy, liberal democracies, and world order. We're delighted that so many of you would join us today, though not surprised. This is, as I said, the second in a series of meetings devised in cooperation with Jeremy Hunt, MP, former foreign secretary, as well as secretary of state for health, but somebody with whom we've been thinking through how we could best address this very big challenge in the international system to the strength of liberal democracies, and have come up with a series of events where we have the opportunity for him to enter into conversation with key players historically and currently on this topic. And may I say for my own part, I know Jeremy will be doing this a minute — how pleased we are to have Dr Henry Kissinger as the second in our series of our speakers. He needs no introduction. I know Jeremy will be introducing him nonetheless, but one of the most thoughtful and experienced thinkers and writers on international affairs and world order that we've known in our generation. So, I can think, with all this going on in the world stage today, of no better time to hear his thoughts with us as part of this series. My job is also to do a little bit of housekeeping, so Jeremy doesn't have to do it. To remind you all this meeting is on the record, as you might expect. It is being recorded, and also a live broadcast on the Chatham House website. We will please ask you, if you have any questions, to submit them into the Q&A function. You also have the option of uploading... Up voting, I should say. Sorry, up voting those questions you like the best. And Jeremy will do his best to get to as many of them as he can over the course of this event. But I do think I have more to say than that. Don't use the chat or raise hands. They're not going to be

¹ Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House

tracked or used for those purposes. Please focus on the Q&A. And we do have the option, I think, of being able to unmute you, hopefully, so you can ask those questions as well when there's an opportunity. So, with that, I don't want to take up any more time handing over to Jeremy Hunt. Jeremy, it's in your hands. Thank you.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt²: [00:05:55] Thank you very much, Robin. And hello, everyone. Thank you so much for joining us. And Dr Henry Kissinger, thank you so much for joining us today. We've been looking forward to this immensely. And Dr. Kissinger is really the most experienced statesman on the planet. As well as being national security adviser, secretary of state, he was responsible for the Nixon to China moment in 1972. He's a thinker who has continued to write since then. And I'll just say this — he is that rarity of being a politician whose ideas have gained currency over the years, rather than being forgotten in the mists of history. And that's why we're so honored to have you today. Henry, last time we met was for breakfast in London when I was foreign secretary. And it felt pretty crazy then, but at least there was no COVID. So, let me just ask... Start by asking how you've been coping with the madness of the pandemic and most importantly, whether you've had your vaccination.

Henry Kissinger: [00:07:07] I've had my vaccination. And I moved to a place where I spend my weekends. And I've been there, almost without interruption, for over a year, working on two books — one on artificial intelligence, and the other on leadership, in which I deal with 5 leaders: Margaret Thatcher, de Gaulle, Richard Nixon, Adenauer and Lee Kuan Yew.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:08:04] Well, I'm sure we'll talk about both artificial intelligence and leadership, but I wonder... I don't want to spend too long today on coronavirus and the pandemic, but I just wanted to open with one question on it, if I may. You were born just three years after the Spanish flu outbreak that killed nearly 50 million people, but there was no global shutdown. This time, deaths are less than 10 percent of that level globally, but the world appears almost to have stopped spinning. I just wonder, what does that tell you about the importance we now attach to individual human lives and how that's changed over your lifetime?

² Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2018-19), UK

Henry Kissinger: [00:08:55] I think it's due to a number of factors, the growth of scientific knowledge, so that was a greater capacity to deal with this pandemic. So, the expectations were greater. The economy was not so global. There were no social networks at that time. But also... Politics, at least in the democracies, have focused more on the individual. It may have been true then. But I'm not sure that's absolutely right, because when there is a catastrophe of this nature, then there is a capacity to deal with it. It's an imperative to deal with it, in any society.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:10:09] Thank you. Let me move on to international affairs. In your book, *Diplomacy*, you characterized the 20th century as really a tension between Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalism and Theodore Roosevelt's *realpolitik*. And you say that Wilsonian idealism basically won that argument. But you wrote that in the 1990s. And since then, we've had the extraordinary rise of China, a country which explicitly rejects Western liberal values. So, I wonder if you still think that liberal internationalism can flourish in the 21st century, or are we heading back to more 19th century *realpolitik*?

Henry Kissinger: [00:11:01] Well, my argument was really focused on America. And the point was that within America, the debate between the idealistic view, that it's that America would maintain itself and prevail through the exercise of its historic democratic values, prevailed over the view that foreign policy should be viewed, in part, from the balance of power perspective, and it's the practical management of relations among nations. That view prevailed, certainly within America. But within America now, there's been a change in the emergence of a view that is not only quite current, but probably dominant in many academic and media environments, that America is... Represents a kind of basic sin, and that it has to be eradicated in the internal discussions before America can really assert its historic values. It's not a denial of democracy so much. It's a redefinition of democracy. I think it's going to be the key debate of the next decade. Not yet fully visible, but quite apparent.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:12:59] I mean, a very powerful part of the American identity is this concept of a shining city on a hill. But this year we saw a mob smashed through the doors of Congress on Capitol Hill. To what extent does America need to reform democracy at home, if it's going to be a beacon for freedom abroad?

Henry Kissinger: [00:13:27] The mob that broke down the doors in the Capitol came after the summer of riots and violence in the cities. And I think both phenomena indicate that America has to find some common position on its view of democracy, lest it absorb too much of its energies in internal debates and even violence.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:14:14] So, let me ask you a bit about the rise of China. Now, most people predict that at some stage in the next decade, the Chinese economy will, for the first time, overtake the United States economy in dollar terms. It may already have overtaken the US economy in purchasing power parity terms. But when that happens, and some people say it will be as soon as 2028, that will be the first time in our lifetimes that the world's largest economy is not a democracy. What impact will that simple fact have on the international order?

Henry Kissinger: [00:15:02] First, the fact that the Chinese economy exceeds the American economy in dollar terms doesn't mean that China will be superior in all the key elements of technology and... So, the question of, the definition of technological superiority is going to be one that will be open for the indefinite future, unless the democracies don't do their duties. Now, the rise of China... When the international order, with which we are familiar, was developed... It was on the pages of governments with comparative league, with similar domestic structures, or similar values. Now, we have a global world order. And the fundamental question that you raised, it says, is it necessary to have a coherent view of governance in order to have a peaceful order? Or is it possible to work out an international order, in which the fundamental domestic principle vary to some extent, but there's an agreement on what is needed to prevent a breakdown of the international order. And if you add to it the element of technology, of the growth of the revolutionary explosion of democracy, the development of artificial intelligence, of cyber and so many other technologies. And if you imagine that the world commits itself to an endless competition based on the dominance of whoever is superior at the moment. Then the breakdown of the order is inevitable, and the consequences of a breakdown would be catastrophic. So... When I write a book, I could say legitimacy is a great... It certainly is important, common legitimacy to have in an international order, but we are living in a world in which the common legitimacy is not seemingly attainable within a period shorter than the development of technology. And so, the key question for the democracies would be one, especially for America, to unify its domestic views. And to distill out of the present debate, another common view. And secondly, to analyze

foreign policy in terms... Whether it should be in missionary terms with an obligation to change governmental structures around the world to make them compatible, or with an initial effort, which for Britain should be very traditional, of analyzing the balance of power, and drawing one's conclusions from that and attempting within that. Of course, it means that other nations will also have to make that same analysis, it cannot be done unilaterally.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:19:41] Can I ask you about this word, "legitimacy", that you used? Because quite a lot of the West's legitimacy in our own self view has come from our democratic principles. But quite a lot of it has also come from our economic success. And in the Cold War, you know, we were massively more successful than the Soviet Union. And that was a very important factor in everyone's considerations. When that moment happens, when the Chinese economy overtakes the United States economy, is that not going to be used by China to question the legitimacy of western hegemony? And isn't there going to be quite a big crisis of confidence in the West, when for the first time we can't say that the richest economy in the world is a democracy?

Henry Kissinger: [00:20:35] Well... I wouldn't define the global issue in terms of who exercises hegemony. The issue in the terms in which you define it will be... And it would be the first time that America has experiences is whether it is possible to deal with a country of comparable magnitude and, maybe, in some respects, marginally ahead, from a position that, first, analyzes the balance that exists and also understands, which in American philosophy is not common, that international problems, basically, don't have final solutions. And that every solution opens the door to another set of problems, which has not been our historic experience. So, is it possible for us to develop a foreign policy thinking, together with allies and understood by other countries that look for world order on the basis of that sort of analysis? If we don't get to that point, and if we don't get to an understanding with China... On that point, that we will be in a pre-World War One type of situation in Europe, in which there are perennial conflicts that get solved on an immediate basis, but one of them gets out of control at some point. And it's infinitely more dangerous. Now, that it was said, and one has to remember that we can say — the sin of the Europeans in 1914 was not only to enter into such a global conflict, but not having any ideas how to end it. So, every country came out diminished in some fashion. And the... That is what I find most concerning in the present world. Now, I cannot tell you that I know that this approach, it's possible. But I know that the other approach, that

the stated objective — the overthrow of the domestic structure of a major country, which, as you describe, will be at least equal to us in capacity, it's much more dangerous. And in any event, I don't accept the proposition that we are doomed to permanent inferiority. I think we're doomed to permanent efforts, that we cannot simply resign and wait for events to evolve. So, that is the requirement for the future.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:24:36] Well, let me ask you about one of those areas of great effort, which is what you're writing one of your books on, which is artificial intelligence, where China has a strategy, the "Made in China 2025" strategy. They want to be dominant in artificial intelligence. And we could see a situation where, for example, the best driverless cars are all Chinese because they are just better at artificial intelligence than us, and their data is better, and they develop safer cars. Is there an argument that we should decouple our technology from China's to avoid that kind of technological dependency?

Henry Kissinger: [00:25:29] Well, if we decouple it from China, we could still wind up in the same situation that you describe, namely that our driverless cars will be much less effective than the Chinese driverless cars. So first, I don't take it for granted that China will be ahead of us. The Chinese have developed a great skill in organizing themselves on a partly internally competitive basis, but under strong state, the state leadership, that is a model that they have so far uniquely developed. On the other hand, up to now, we have been perhaps more inventive in the basic evolution, up to now. Now, we in the West, whatever domestic structure, cannot avoid developing our own technological capability in a manner that is competitive, or superior, or only undecisively³ inferior. But that depends on our societies, that isn't something that we can achieve by aggrivement. With the Chinese, it seems to me not probable that any single country can develop across the whole range of technology in the face of what the West is capable of doing. But the West has to believe in itself before it can really make a serious effort. And that is our domestic problem, that is not a Chinese problem.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:27:56] Thank you. Let me just pursue the points you made about the risk of accidental conflicts like World War One, or what some people have called the Thucydides trap, when you have a rising power and an existing power. You have had more dialogue with China over the years than anyone else. So, could you

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describe what kind of international order would be acceptable both to China, and also to those of us that believe in open societies?

Henry Kissinger: [00:28:35] Well, I can't necessarily describe the nature of the order. My analysis of Chinese purposes... It's not that China is determined to achieve a world domination, but whatever that means, I think the Chinese efforts are based on a combination of Confucianism and Marxist organization, in which they're trying to develop the maximum capabilities of which their society is able. Now, if these maximum capabilities lead to a huge gap between them, in their favor, and the rest of the world, then that will be reflected in their diplomacy. But the diplomacy does not start like the Soviet one did — that they must physically dominate the world. Because, unlike the Soviets, who were driven by a great feeling of inner insecurity, and they were not sure they were influential unless they were present, the Chinese, in my opinion, tend to believe that if their performance is majestic and the scale of their efforts is great, then a mythical respect will develop, on the basis of which they can achieve growing influence. That is in our capacity to prevent without military conflict with China. So, on this particular issue, I don't accept that China is... Statistically, they will be ahead because of larger numbers of people. But in the combination of technology and performance, we can at least hold our own. And then the question is — how we relate this to dealing with them? I believe that it is possible, and in any event, it should be tried. Because a conflict between countries possessing high technology, with weapons that can target themselves and that can start the conflict by themselves, without some agreement of some kind of restraint, cannot end well. And that's an understatement. And so, that is my great concern. But I don't begin accepting the basic premise that a combination of European technology, and American technology, and what technologies may develop in other countries, is doomed to inferiority against the Chinese technology, able as they are. And this is why I favor an approach that at least keeps open that option.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt [00:32:07] Thank you. Now, if the purpose of an international order is to prevent war, then it needs to promote the virtues of dialogue and compromise, which are essentially Enlightenment values, they're part of the DNA of democracies, because we have to accept... [Zoom lag]... parties with an election, but single-party systems are usually a bit closer to thinking that might is right, which is a very different approach. So, does it follow that western countries need to make sure that

they remain central to the construction of a new world order? So that it does promote those values of dialogue and compromise?

Henry Kissinger: [00:33:13] Well... In any negotiation, it is important to consider an outcome with which all the participants in the negotiation can live, without pressing against it. So, any negotiation, it has a concept of legitimacy underlying it. So, whether the Chinese, or with a partner... I don't want to focus everything on the Chinese... But whether they accept the importance of dialogue to the degree that we do or not, the issue is — can they accept the outcome as one with which they can live and which they are willing to maintain for a substantial period of time. Which is the basis on which diplomacy has been conducted in most periods. And when diplomacy took the form of undermining the domestic structure, or defeating the domestic structure of another state, then one gets into the situation that Burke described very well in his analysis of the French Revolution, in which he... Basically, one of his distinctions was that the French Revolution could not make peace with anybody, until it had overthrown the system. While the British view of diplomacy at that time was that they would protect their safety and work for an international structure in which Britain was saved, meaning Britain dominated the oceans. But those are two radically different views. The 19th century international order was based, essentially, on a sophisticated operation of the balance of power with each country, developing the domestic structures. And it was also a period that moved towards democracy, which might be due to the fact that it was a largely peaceful century. And the more intense the conflicts between nations, even if they're based on ideology, the more difficult that becomes to have compatible institutions.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt [00:36:23] Thank you. We've got lots of people who want to ask you questions Henry, but I just want to finish with a quick question on America, one on Europe and one on Britain. First of all, on America — people are wondering whether there's going to be much difference between the Trump-Pompeo approach and the Biden-Blinken approach. What did you make of the optics of the meeting in Anchorage between Blinken and Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi? And are you concerned about matters being something that may make it difficult for America and China to work together with the new administration?

Henry Kissinger: [00:37:12] Well... The art of diplomacy has been, in part — to separate the relationship of the diplomats from the relationship of the countries, so the dialogue is conducted on the assumption that the opposite number... It's not the reason for the conflict. So, it is an unusual way. To begin a conference with a sharp statement of disagreement between the two sides elaborated by their foreign ministers. On the other hand, if... I leave open the possibility that expressed by our leaders. To the effect that it did not stand in the way of a businesslike discussion that followed. So that both sides were appealing to their public. If that was the case, I would recommend not repeating it too often. Because it may have a quite contradictory effect. Because the public see the performance, and not the actual event, but I leave open that this is what happened. And my impression is that the Biden administration, it's seeking, in its way, to move towards a position in which a more peaceful world order, a more stable world order can emerge. That is my impression of their purposes. And I don't foreclose that on the basis of the opening conduct of the two sides.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:39:48] Thank you. Let me ask you a question about Britain and Europe. You once said that American governments had always encouraged European integration, but found it difficult to come to terms with the consequences. And when it came to Britain, you were asked to join the campaign against Brexit, but you declined to take sides. What do you think Britain's role should be, as the international order changes?

Henry Kissinger: [00:40:20] Well, in the debate on Brexit, almost all my British friends were on the remain side. And they asked me to join the debate, which I generally don't do. Anyway, but as I reflected about it, I saw some utility, some considerable utility in a role for Britain as a bridge between Europe and the United States. I don't look at Brexit as a mean for Britain to conduct a totally autonomous foreign policy. I think, in the fields of strategy and world order, Britain has enormous common interests with Europe. But it also has a tradition of cooperation with America, so that... And for Britain, the definition of autonomy has not been so central as it is for some European states, because it has always been autonomous in its conduct. So, I think... I thought then, and I think now that Britain is in a very strong position because of its historic ties to America and its natural connection and its necessity with this, with respect to Europe. So, that is a role in which it is not healthy for the United States to be an island at the conjunction of the Atlantic and the Pacific, having to deal with all the land masses around it in the traditional island

fashion of keeping them divided. So, it is helpful for America to have an Atlantic Group in. And I think that Britain can play an extremely useful role and maintain a new relationship with Europe and with us. And that it would be of benefit to the United States and Britain, but it's not a widely held view.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:43:09] Thank you. Well, we've got lots and lots of questions. I'm just going to ask you one final one. You end your book, *Diplomacy*, with the Spanish saying "Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by walking". Which roads do you want to be remembered for following?

Henry Kissinger: [00:43:32] You know, you've been in the Oval Office, if you start reflecting about your own role, you can pay attention to the key issues which you should address as a foreign secretary. So, all I can do is to leave a thoughtful record of what I did, and why I did it. And then let others decide what contribution it made.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:44:13] Well, that's a very, very modest reply, but thank you very much. Now, we've got about 15 minutes for questions. So, I want to go first to Max [Froths?], who wants to ask about illiberal democracies, and after that, to Thomas Cole, who wants to ask about the U.N.

Max Froths: [00:44:45] Dr. Kissinger, I have a question about the nature of illiberal democracies. On the basis of the recent experiences in my native Poland and some other countries in the region, I'm wondering, is there more that brings liberal and illiberal democracies together, or is it more than divides them? And is there a threat that illiberal democracies can actually join forces with the non-democratic regimes of this world, rather than working together with liberal democracies? Where are the fault lines, and how dangerous is the phenomenon of illiberal democracies? Thank you.

Henry Kissinger: [00:45:28] As I said before, that depends on how liberal democracies define themselves, and what the outcome in the internal debate in the illiberal democracies is. I think there's a slight danger that the illiberal democracies might join the authoritarian regime. But I don't think that it's a very great danger, because in essence, they might do tactical things in economics, but joining them on fundamental issues... I think that it's less likely, but of course, I would personally prefer liberal democracies, but I would want to make clear — the debate within the liberal

democracies also has to find some limits, and it cannot be about the question of the degree of sinfulness of the country concerned. Because I do not see how a country can do great things, if it educates itself entirely on the basis of its failures.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:47:08] Thank you. Let's go on to Thomas Cole next.

Thomas Cole: [00:47:15] Yes, good afternoon. Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the United Nations, in its current form, meets the needs of international politics in the 21st century?

Henry Kissinger: [00:47:29] Well, the United Nations has some important utilities, in providing a forum for discussion and providing the technical and legal means of executing common decisions, of providing participants in dialogues. But the relationship of the Security Council to the UN needs to be redefined in the nature because of the changes in the global structure. Because of the emergence of so many countries, or of a number of countries which are equal, at least in the capabilities to the existing permanent members. This is one of the unsolved issues. I'm candid to say that I don't know what the answer to it is, but I think it's an issue that we need reflection and, hopefully, resolution in the next decade.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:48:54] Thank you. Let's go to Joan Howie, who's editor of the Economist Intelligence Unit, who wants to talk about America's internal divisions. And after that, we'll go to Alanna McLaren with a question on the pandemic.

Joan Howie: [00:49:10] Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. I wanted to probe you a bit more on what you're saying about American democracy and the debate about it. So, you emphasize very much the divisions now in the US. So, I wanted to ask you: where those have come from, and are you confident that they can be overcome what you call this obsession with the sinfulness of the country, if you like?

Henry Kissinger: [00:49:50] First. I've already said far too much than it's good for me on this subject, on the record manner. But let me state, let me make a point. There's no doubt that America committed great moral wrongs at the beginning of its history. And it's no question that they need to be rectified. And that they are being rectified. I just hope they don't become the core of our domestic debate, and that the country doesn't define

itself entirely on the basis of its ethnic groups, but on the basis of the matter of the differences of each groups, the only way they can cooperate with each other. This is something that our national leadership... And this is beyond party. We have to, within our academic and other leaderships, have to find a positive expression of it and not simply a restatement of past errors. It's not an issue in which I have been as involved as I have been in diplomatic issues, so I can only give my instinctive answer, and not one that I have thought through as much as I have should.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:52:01] Thank you. Alanna McLaren, and then Brooks Newmark, and then Ann Cormack.

Alanna McLaren: [00:52:07] Hi, thank you both very much for your time. I just want to ask Dr. Kissinger, how do you consider the pandemic to have affected the trajectory of international integration and the viability of the nation state?

Henry Kissinger: [00:52:22] Well, the pandemic has to teach every state. It depends on other societies, and there is no purely national way one can deal with a pandemic issue. At a minimum, there needs to be an exchange of information, and where possible, an exchange and learning from each other's practices. If we drive our disputes to the point of who can benefit most vis-a-vis other societies, then we are in a truly catastrophic state for the future of world order. So, the pandemic might at least teach humanity to be good, that they are imperative necessities in dealing with destructive capabilities. And from that, hopefully, one could learn practical measures that might be applied to the issues that we discussed earlier — of the underlying political relationship of countries to each other. But it requires a correct understanding of what occurred in the pandemic, it seems to me, at least, one key lesson.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:54:17] Thank you. Brooks Newmark, next, and then Ann Cormac wants to ask you about younger people.

Brooks Newmark: [00:54:25] Dr. Kissinger, of all the world leaders, and you've met many, that you've engaged with over the years... Which leader have you admired most, and what characteristics do they have that led you to that conclusion?

Henry Kissinger: [00:54:50] I was impressed... I don't want to give names of world leaders... But what I... What really impressed me, is the degree to which they could write above the conventional wisdom of their societies and the degree to which they could understand that the issues that were being dealt with had to be judged not only in terms of the immediate attitudes, but in terms of how they could contribute to an evolution that would lead to a stabler system. And I would apply that even due to adversaries. So, in negotiations with adversaries, there is still some glimmer, or, sometimes, conviction, that they wanted to transcend the immediate issue. And that they understood the deeper issues of their society and world order. That would be... That would include people that would impress me. While people who were very impressive in immediate public relations statements that I could not relate to a longer view, I look more at tactical and not as equally significant.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:56:56] We've got lots of Brits here today. Can I just ask you what your thinking is about Margaret Thatcher, given that she's featuring in your book?

Henry Kissinger: [00:57:09] Well, I have great affection for Margaret Thatcher. Because when I made a first... She announced, she told me — she just has been elected a Labour... [Corrects himself] A Conservative leader and first woman to have been elected, only the second of middle-class origins. And so, she told me in the first meeting that she was not going to conduct a policy on the basis of winning over the center... Winning by changing the center, but by moving the center towards her, rather than moving to the center. That was a totally unusual change at the time. And in all her relationships, she tried to get to the essence of the problem she was dealing with. And she did it with courage, and flair, and with a... And did very difficult things, even for herself. So, I've written a very long essay on her, so it's more complicated than I can express here, but...

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [00:59:10] Something for us to look forward to. I will just take the last question from Amy Cormack.

Ann Cormack: [00:59:20] Hello, good afternoon. Dr. Kissinger, what an honor! We hear that outstanding leaders speak to the head and the heart. My head is buzzing, and my heart strings are being pulled listening to you this afternoon. But my question is the

degree to which you think young people appreciate the value of and the values of liberal democracy. So, will liberal democracy thrive in the hands of the next generation?

Henry Kissinger: [00:59:56] I tell you, frankly, this is... If you... The part that I think about a lot and have not given a good answer to. You know, I lived as a persecuted minority in a totalitarian state. So, I have experienced the importance of democracy, but I don't believe in effortless achievements. And in order to create something on a democratic basis, you have to believe in your society. And... So, I think your question is the deep question of our period. And if it can be answered positively... But I can't give... It means that we have to believe in our society to some extent, and then find extensions of it that are meaningful. It cannot evolve simply from a negative posture towards our societies. And too much of our domestic debates, at least in America, tend now in that direction. And the... It's our problem, but I believe in the solution. I don't use that saying that we are therefore doomed. I'm saying the opposite, that we have to find a solution to this, and then we can solve all the other problems that were raised here on a genuinely democratic basis.

The Rt Hon. Jeremy Hunt: [01:02:16] Thank you. It's an excellent question. Ann Cormack, not Amy Cormack. Apologies for getting that wrong up. Henry, the first time I met you, I just given my first speech as foreign secretary in Washington. And the first thing you said to me was: "I read your speech yesterday, and I'm afraid I don't agree with it". And then we had a frank discussion about the dangers of over-muscular diplomacy. So, then I asked you: "What's the difference between a good foreign minister and a bad foreign minister?". And you said that you hadn't been asked that very often before, but it was really about the difference between people who thought strategically about solutions to problems, and not just tactically about what was going to happen the next day, and we are very, very lucky to have someone who has thought strategically his whole life when he was in office and out of office. And we've heard that wisdom today. We're all extremely grateful. But I think we've heard something new, which I haven't heard you say before, which is that if we're really going to resolve the problems of liberal democracy, we need self-belief, we need confidence. That if we have that confidence, those problems are absolutely soluble. So, that's a nice, optimistic note after a pretty horrible year. Thank you so much for your time. It's enormously appreciated by me, by everyone at Chatham House, and by our audience tonight. And on that note, I'm going to conclude the proceedings. We're going to give you a virtual

clap, but we're incredibly grateful for your time and your wonderful insights. Thank you very much. And that concludes today's session. Thank you.