Can Russia afford another nuclear arms race?

Jonas J. Driedger is a political scientist and analyst. He specializes in the security and defense policies of Russia, Germany, NATO, and the EU, as well as in Western-Russian relations, deterrence, international relations theory, and the causes of military conflict. Jonas contributed analyses to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Politico Europe, The National Interest, EUObserver, and EurActiv. He is currently a visiting researcher at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and partakes in the Alfa Fellowship Program.

In the light of recent developments, a new Russo-American nuclear arms race seems increasingly likely. Following its economic and political recovery, and starting in 2011, Russia made “catching up” with the United States in the strategic sphere a top priority in its long-term State Armament Programs. Under the Trump administration, the United States announced a withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a policy of Nuclear Superiority. This study seeks to raise and provide answers to the following questions: Could Russia afford another nuclear arms race with the United States? If so, what kinds of technological, economic, and political commitments and investments would Russia have to undertake? Many analysts have warned of a new arms race, with some stating Russia could not afford it due to its material inferiority to the United States. They have not, however, explored the implications of scenarios of a more limited arms race. Furthermore, no study has explicated which exact variables and causal mechanisms would enable or disable Russia to sustain a nuclear arms race. To fill these gaps, this study surveys primary Russian policy documents, newspaper articles, and analytical assessments of Russia’s military, technological, economic, and societal capabilities. The study develops two explicit arms race scenarios, one moderate and one extreme. In the extreme scenario, Russia seeks to match US efforts analogous to the height of the Cold War. The moderate scenario is situated half-way between the extreme scenario and today’s situation. The study then discusses whether and how Russia could match such efforts in the realm of technology (ability to develop), economy (ability to fund), and society (ability to sustain). The study finds that Russia could not afford the extreme scenario, and would face major domestic political problems in the moderate scenario. These findings have implications for future research, Russo-American diplomacy and Russian Foreign and Security Policy.

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