

Evolution of European Automobile Manufacturing: Uneven Industrial Upgrading in Europe


Junior Researcher Alexander Vasilchenko

ORCID: 0000-0002-4904-1562



Contents

- 1. Problem statement
- 2. Models of the European automobile production
- 3. Current challenges and prospects
- 4. Conclusions




Source: ACEA.



Global Production Networks: conceptual remarks

- 1. Fragmented yet coordinated (Coe, Yeung 2015)
- 2. Local, regional, global interplay (Dicken 2008)
- 3. Governance, lead firms, and value creation (Gereffi, Humphrey, Sturgent 2008)
- 4. Clusters, coordinators, multitier architecture (Kim et al. 2014)
- Regional embeddedness, developing and dependent linkages (see Pavlínek 2018; Boschma 2024)



Global Production Network

Region

'Core-periphery' relations in global production networks

- 1. Historically, Germany, France and Italy were on the forefront of European automotive manufacturing
- 2. Eastern European countries, being in Comecon*, developed their own (barely competitive) production base
- 3. Skoda, for instance, was almost self-sufficient
- 4. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact CEE** countries integrated with the Western Europe
- 5. So did their automobile sector
- 6. In hindsight, promises were high...

*Comecon - The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

**CEE - Central and Eastern Europe

Evolution of European Automobile Manufacturing: Uneven Industrial Upgrading in Europe

1. Factor prices disequilibrium

('breeding ground' for costs arbitrage)

2. Production fragmentation (outsourcing, cooperation)

Supposed to be there...

7. Stagnating informal integration

... but now only here

3. Informal (grassroots) integration (transfer of knowledge)



6. Reducing incentives for fragmentation (severing of dependent linkages)

8. Formation of new

barriers for factors'

movement (peripheral

dictate)

4. Increasing freedom of factors' movement

5. Factor prices equilibrium (lesser arbitrage opportunities)



Problem

Question 1. What were the drivers of the evolution of European automobile manufacturing?

Question 2. Why CEE countries lag behind Western economies in automobile manufacturing?

Question 3. How the 'Twin Transition' might affect 'core-periphery' pattern?

ACEA MEMBERS		BMW GROUP GROUP	DAF
DAIMLER TRUCK		Ford	HONDA The Power of Dreems
Э НҮППОЯІ	I V E C O • G R O U P	JLR	
Renault Group	тоуота	VOLKSWAGEN GROUP	VOLVO




'Traditional' model of European automobile manufacturing

- I. A rapid increase in the number of outsourcing and offshoring activities
- II. 'Core' economies utilized cheap labor force in CEE countries
 - a. Forceful transition to lead firms' standards
 - b. Anchoring in low-end activities
- III. Dependent linkages became prevalent
 - Foreign-controlled assembly plants in Slovakia appeared poorly integrated in the local economy. Interactions with domestic suppliers were absent

IV. Key drivers:

- CEE market liberalization
- 2. EU expansion
- 3. Crisis of European automobile sector competitiveness

Formal representation of the 'traditional' model




Source: author's elaboration.



'Consolidative' model of European automobile manufacturing

- I. Triple consolidation
 - a. Technological (limited number of unified modules and platforms)
 - b. Geographical (key suppliers migrated closely to factories)
 - c. Organizational (fusion of suppliers and lead firms)
- II. Peripheral suppliers were supplanted by well-established partners of the lead firms
- III. CEE economies relied extensively (and imprudently) on automobile sector
- IV. Co-location of suppliers in close vicinity to assembly plants hampered spill-over effects for the rest of the economy
- V. <u>Key drivers:</u>
 - 1. Modular production technology
 - 2. Agglomeration forces
 - 3. Mega-suppliers

Production corridor of European automobile manufacturing (number of jobs, 2019, NUTS2 regions)



Source: author's elaboration following Lung, Gerpisa (2004).


Upgrading in Europe



'Transformative' model of European automobile manufacturing

- I. Revolutionary technologies
 - a. Electric engines instead of ICE
 - b. IoT
 - c. A
- II. Reassembly of the whole value-chain
 - a. Less stages
 - b. Some in, some out
 - c. Greater lead firm control
- III. 'Unexpectedly uneven' regional development
 - a. New 'growth poles': Portugal, Finland, ...
 - b. 'Giants from scratch' (battery and assembly plants in Hungary)
- IV. Long live the new master?
 - I. Chinese FDI are not costless...
 - II. Withdrawal of Western MNEs (dismissals in Poland and Slovakia)
- V. <u>Key drivers:</u>
 - I. 'Twin transition'
 - II. Chinese 'frenzy' expansion
 - III. Pulsating emergence of new actors and locations

Changing roles of automobile production agents amidst 'electric transition'





Source: author's elaboration.

Periphery as the second (or even third) fiddle

- I. Creation of new jobs is induced by cost minimization of lead firms
- II. Upwards of 80% of workers satisfy foreign demand
- III. Specialization patterns have not changed significantly
- IV. On average, the share of complex goods in exports increased by 6 pp, while the share of primitive goods increased by 15 pp
- V. Counter OODA
 - a. Should be: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
 - b. In reality: Obey, Owe, Depend, Adjust

Jobs created (horizontal axis) and labor cost index (vertical axis) in automobile production (by country)






Source: author's elaboration on Eurostat and ERM.

Core-periphery convergence is contestable

- I. On the one hand, value added created in the 'periphery' grows faster than in the 'core' (beta convergence)
- II. On the other hand, dispersion of the same metric increases steadily (sigma convergence)
- III. In other words, CEE countries lack economies of scale to catch up with the 'core' effectively
- IV. Why lagging is so glaring?
 - a. Technology transfer is limited (IP protection)
 - b. MNEs are not interested in competitors
 - c. Lobbying and bargaining opportunities are incomparable
 - d. Lock in, path-dependence and financial constraints

Sigma and beta converge of the level of value-added created in automobile manufacturing in the 'core' and the 'periphery' (1996-2020, index, 1995=1)




Source: author's elaboration on OECD Trade in Value Added.



What does the future hold? (it's not easy to unfold)

- I. First and foremost, 'technology territorial capital' interplay will matter
- II. We don't know yet how far will the 'twin transition' go
- III. Chinese potential to expand its FDI in CEE is unknown...
- IV. ...however, existing 'greenfields' ensure long-standing influence in the region
- V. Today the last thing to do... is to make predictions
- VI. But still some projections can be outlined:
 - A. Core-periphery patterns may become less distinct (analytically wise)
 - B. Value creation and distribution in the industry will reshape
 - C. But for concerted and extensive innovation policy, Europe risks to become Chinese backyard...





Evolution of European Automobile Manufacturing: Uneven Industrial Upgrading in Europe

Junior Researcher Alexander Vasilchenko

ORCID: 0000-0002-4904-1562