The article analyzes post-Soviet economic policy in the light of the previous periods of the Russian economic history. The authors find a striking similarity between the measures proposed by modern Russian economic liberals – as well as their consequences – and the actions taken by the Russian authorities during much earlier periods. They explain these similarities with the fact that “Western” terms can mean something very different in the context of a non-Western culture, phenomena and institutions with the same names in different types of societies can differ fundamentally and perform different functions. Furthermore, “Westernization” can be a purely superficial process intended more for show than for substance. By applying the methodology of substantivism which stresses the fundamental differences between economies based on gifts (reciprocity), redistribution, and exchange (market), they argue that Russia’s economy differs significantly from that of the countries of Western Europe and, in the typological sense, is closer to such European countries as Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, and Serbia. For this reason, similar measures of economic policy applied in Western Europe and Russia bring different results.
This book is based on the collection of articles centered around Russia and its policies. The articles are grouped under three parts. The first part contains articles on international relations, Russian foreign policy, and the situation in the world. The main themes they cover include Russian policy in Asia and the Eurasian integration — in which Moscow plays the most active role.
The second part looks at the theorization of Russia’s internal processes, issues concerning reforms to the communist system, its troubled transition from Communism, and analysis of the country’s current political regime. While elaborating on various reforms and transition from the communist system, the author has suggested certain alternatives concepts. Many of the articles analyze the shortcomings and inconsistencies of the modern Russian political system.
The third part is devoted to current issues in Russian politics, the democratization process, growing authoritarian tendencies, mass protests, and that evaluate the programs and policies of individual leaders. The book will be of interest to those specializing in Russian foreign and domestic policy as well as to all those interested in following the developments of this country, its role in the world, and the global situation in general.
The author argues that Russian–Chinese rapprochement is a fundamental feature of the current changing system of international relations. Apart from its own significance, it has become important because it stimulated and, in some cases, laid the foundation for many broader international processes: the creation of the multipolar world, the emergence of such international groups and organisations as BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the coordination between Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese initiative of Silk Road Economic Belt and others. Recently, all these processes led to the idea of Greater Eurasia or Eurasian partnership.
The Trump administration’s confrontational approach has prompted a serious debate in China about the country’s economic and political course.
The rise of China as well as its unprecedented economic success turned to be one of the most important factors in the world development in the late XX and early XXI centuries and transformed the country into the second most influential player on the international scene. This change caused a heated debate within the country about the prospects of Beijing’s foreign policy and economic course, with two major directions emerging as a result. The first group calls for a more active behaviour of China as a great power on the international arena, taking the example of the United States. It strives to achieve this goal through all available means, including military ones, to ensure China’s economic and political interests abroad, to put forward its own alternative to Western concepts of world development, and to create alternative trade and economic unions and zones. As a result, supporters of this line seek to move away from Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy of modesty and restraint. The second group of realists believes that it is necessary to follow Deng’s principles, since the country is yet to secure the status of a major world power and can lose its current advantages, which come with a more modest status. They suggest that following the first path will provoke an unfavorable reaction of the international community. Chinese leadership has taken an intermediate position in this debate, holding back the most radical proposals of the activists and adopting some of the moderate ones. The debate, which has been vigorous since the beginning of the XXI century became particularly acute after the start of the trade war initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump. It revealed many of China’s weaknesses as well as its significant dependence on the United States. During the exacerbation, a number of experts criticised certain aspects of domestic and foreign policy of China’s current leadership, including the “belt and road initiative” initiative. Some claim that this initiative, along with a number of other major projects adopted by the Chinese government, for instance, the “Made in China 2025” plan, could have provoked Trump’s tough response, which may put China’s development at stake. Some major Beijing’s partners are also criticising certain forms of realisation of this initiative. The article examines the available sources shedding light on the public and non-public side of the debate, as well as its possible implications for China’s foreign and domestic policy and Sino-Russian relations.
The article is devoted to the problems of the development of modern
relations of Russia, China and the Pacific states of Latin America. Author focuses
on potential of cooperation of these states in multilateral formats and dialogues and
the reform of the economic and institutional order in the Asia-Pacific. The relevance
of such cooperation is increasing due to the crisis of the international order that has
emerged in the Asia-Pacific region. This crisis manifests itself in two aspects. First,
we may observe a certain lack of institutions of regulation of economic relations
and ideas for their further development. Such a complex agenda is shaped by Russia
and China in relation to Eurasia (the concept of “Greater Eurasia”), but the promotion
of a similar agenda in the APEC faces many contradictions. Second, the Asia-Pacific
region is becoming an area of confrontation between the United States and China,
which is also manifested in the struggle for the future configuration of the regional
order in the region. The Pacific countries of Latin America were
not affected by either the Russian or Chinese mega-initiatives of recent years, which
are aimed precisely at creating a new international order. Meanwhile, these countries
are APEC members and participants in many regional initiatives, as well as potentially
significant economic partners for both Russia and China. Moreover, the author believes
that a similar level of economic development and similar needs objectively bring together
the views and approaches of the leading Eurasian powers and the Pacific states of Lat-
in America to the development of multilateral institutions of the regional order. However,
the historically established institutional and political linkage of these countries to
the United States currently determines their support for American initiatives. This provision,
however, is not a given, and some irregularity of the American regional policy under
the Trump administration makes the development of dialogue with these countries on
the broad problems of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region
even more in demand. The author considers the proposed analysis
and some conclusions as an opportunity for academic and expert discussion on the
A rapprochement between Russia and China is clearly taking place today. Yet as cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has increased in recent years, significant differences have emerged between how Russian and Chinese pundits view the relationship and its prospects, on the one hand, and how observers outside the two countries perceive it, on the other. Current U.S. policy takes the contradictory approach of exerting pressure on both countries, surrounding them with military bases, and bolstering inimical military alliances with their neighbors, while at the same time trying to reach separate agreements with each country on specific issues. Such new principles of world order would also serve to restrain emerging powers such as Russia and China that increasingly act at their own discretion in the absence of such rules. However, that would require the United States and its allies to relinquish the monopoly on interpreting international law to which they have become accustomed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Western elites will find this prospect extremely objectionable, the West must inevitably relinquish that dominant role because its influence in world politics is clearly decreasing, while that of other players is growing.
Contrary to the popular narrative of ‘return’, the spheres of influence that have destabilized Ukraine are not a throwback to the nineteenth century. They are something new. What makes them new is explained here in a story of a failed experiment to escape geopolitics in a region between the borders of an enlarged European Union (EU) and Russia. This project created a ‘grey zone’ of overlapping authority, jurisdiction and allegiance out of which new spheres of influence emerged. Ukraine’s geopolitical misfortune was to be included into this ‘grey zone’. The logic of this new narrative of the Ukraine crisis is worked out with reference to the literature on neo-medievalism – a political theory that develops a critique of supranational projects like European integration.
With many predicting the end of US hegemony, Russia and China's growing cooperation in a number of key strategic areas looks set to have a major impact on global power dynamics. But what lies behind this Sino-Russian rapprochement? Is it simply the result of deteriorated Russo-US and Sino-US relations or does it date back to a more fundamental alignment of interests after the Cold War? This book by leading expert on Sino-Russian relations Alexander Lukin attempts to answerthese questions by offering a deeply-informed and nuanced assessment of Russia andChina's ever-closer ties. Tracing the evolution of this partnership from the 1990s to the present day, he shows how economic and geopolitical interests drove the two counties together in spite of political and cultural differences. Key areas of cooperation and possible conflict are explored from bilateral trade and investment to immigration andsecurity. Ultimately, Lukin argues that China and Russia's informal alliance is part of agrowing system of cooperation in the non-Western world, which has also seen theemergence of a new political community: Greater Eurasia. Combining accessibility withexpert sensitivity to the complexities of the subject, Lukin's vision of the new China-Russia rapprochement will be essential reading for anyone interested in understanding this evolving partnership and the way in which it is altering the contemporary geopolitical landscape.
Country Report Russian section
The 9th iteration of this go-to textbook on contemporary Russian politics offers comprehensive and critical discussion of the country’s most recent developments, providing substantive coverage of the key areas in domestic and foreign Russian politics. Ranging from established topics such as executive leadership, parties and elections, to newer issues of national identity, protest, and Russia and Greater Eurasia, it reflects the changing nature of Russian politics in a globalising world defined by ever-shifting balances of power.
Building on the success of previous versions, Developments in Russian Politics 9 is an established text for modules on Russian politics. Its chapters can also be used as standalone or supplementary reading at various points throughout courses on comparative government and politics. Accessibly written, and compiled by an international team of specialists, it will appeal to both undergraduate and postgraduate students from across the world.
The idea of Eurasia per se is not nearly as old as that of its constituent parts – Europe and Asia. The latter two date back to ancient Greece, whereas, according to some accounts, not until the 1880s did the Austrian geologist Eduard Suess first coin the term “Eurasia.” His idea was to fashion a union of the two divided parts of a single continent as a demonstration of their inherent unity – initially in the geologic and geographic sense, and later, in the social and political sense.
This paper argues that Russia’s strategic objective of developing its Asiatic regions is tied to its serious intentions in Asia as a whole. It stresses that Russia can only connect to the political, economic, and cultural life of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific through its own Asian regions. Moreover, leaders’ claims that Russia belongs to both Europe and Asia will carry little weight with their Asiatic neighbors if Russia’s own Asiatic regions remain underdeveloped and subject to shrinking populations. The paper critically analyzes the results of various projects of development of Asiatic Russia beginning from late tsarist period until the 21st century and shows that Russia needs to put forward a formal strategy for developing the Eurasian infrastructure that is comparable to the SREB, Kazakhstan’s NurlyZhol (Bright Path) economic stimulus plan, Mongolia’s Steppe Road, and others. This strategy should reflect Russia’s objectives for the economic development of its own Asiatic regions, and through them, the co-development with its neighbors of Eurasia generally. It argues that the Trans-Eurasian Belt Development, put forward by several Russia think tanks, could become Russia’s contribution to the development of the Eurasian space and mesh with the Chinese, Kazakh, Mongolian, and other partner initiatives. Its implementation would help spur the economic development of Asiatic Russia, enabling that region to become part of the larger economic development of Eurasia. That would help turn Russia into a more important independent and constructive player in the Eurasian space, acting in close coordination with its partners in both the East and the West.
Eurasia, wherever one draws the boundaries, is very much at the centre of discussions about today’s world. Security across Eurasia is a global concern and has been subject to a range of discussions and debate. However, the current tensions over security and world order, with the growing challenges from Eurasia and Asia, require more intense scrutiny. The goals of the book are to explore the challenges facing the region and to assess how to achieve economic, social and political stability in the Eurasian core.
In March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, relations between Moscow and the West descended into their deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War. For the rest of that year and into the next, the Ukraine crisis made headlines around the world. It emerged as the most urgent security challenge facing Western nations. The response to this crisis, from Western leaders, in particular, is key to understanding why ‘spheres of influence’ are the subject of political discourse today, and why this discourse alters our understanding of the past, present and future.
Eurasia has never been one of major directions of Japan’s foreign policy, but its importance for Tokyo is growing. This article analyzes its increasing significance to foreign policy of Japan, causes and consequences of this policy’s duality and inconsistency. It also studies the reasons for the limited success of Tokyo’s diplomacy in Eurasia and discusses possible prospects for growing Japanese involvement in the region. It concludes that Japan’s Eurasian policy is inconsistent and is likely to remain so since the cause behind it remains unchanged – that is, the contradiction between Japan’s actual economic interests and its willingness to follow in the ideological and geopolitical footsteps of the U.S. The path Japan takes in the future will largely depend on the economic results of the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt, its linkage with the plans of the Eurasian Economic Union, the progress of Russian–Chinese cooperation, and the project of Greater Eurasian partnership put forward by Russia and supported by China. If the economic projects of Eurasia’s non-Western players prove effective, Tokyo will be more tempted to cooperate with them despite its close ties with the U.S. However, if Eurasia’s non-Western states, and particularly China, are overly active with their foreign policy and militaries in the Asia Pacific, it will push Tokyo to create a variety of structures that would curb and serve as a political counterbalance to Chinese and Russian influence.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project in January 2017
effectively marked the end (at least—for some time) of the period of active competition
between so-called “mega-regional agreements” in the Asia-Pacific region. A flagship of
the Obama administration’s initiatives in Asia, the TPP spurred China to intensify work
on an alternative project—its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—
and sparked an unusual wave of competition among APR institutions. Significantly,
Russia joined this “partnership race” in 2016, putting forward an initiative to build a
Greater Eurasian Partnership. It became something of a given that any power aspiring to
regional leadership must have its own “partnership plan” to promote. At the same time,
the formation and development of mega-regional partnerships is an important stage in
the regionalization of the world economy and global politics and a key element of the
new phenomenon of regionalization. This article examines the TPP and RCEP initiatives
as attempts to form a regional international order holding some degree of autonomy
from the global set of rules for the functioning of regional international systems—in this
case, that of the APR.
The article analyses the current Russian regime and its possible alternatives, both nationalist and pro-Western, from the viewpoint of various theoretical approaches. It argues that applying the criteria and terminology of political science, which are usually used in studies of modern Western societies, to define contemporary Russia’s social and economic system is just as pointless as describing its political system in terms of the modern Western political system. It further states that to achieve an economic breakthrough, the Russian leadership will have to move towards: developing state institutions that are governed by the rule of law; the separation of powers; the restoration of self-government; and the creation of favourable conditions for, primarily, small and medium-size businesses.
The authors argue that Russian-Chinese rapprochement is a fundamental feature of the current changing system of international relations. The two countries are effectively enabling each other to conduct independent foreign policies often in direct opposition to the West. There is a degree of complimentarity between the two sides with Russia having comparative advantage in the military, intelligence, and diplomatic fields and China being an economic superpower. The region of Central Asia has in reality become the cradle of the two countries’ cooperation which is now affecting a wide range of international issues. The Korean peninsula is another important area of coordination between Moscow and Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. Russia and China have also been working on increasing interoperability of their military forces in the region since mid- 2000s. Technically they have already done much in preparing the ground for a military alliance. However, politically they do not appear to be ready for that yet.